



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

human thinking except the name. Yet such criticism misses its purpose if its final result is merely to bring about a refinement of logic and not a reconsideration of our premises. When a philosophy bids us turn our backs upon the affairs of this world and seek the fulfilment of our aspirations in the contemplation of an n -dimensional world, created from false premises and by a dubious logic, it is high time to remind ourselves that the true mission of philosophy is something quite different. The "emancipation" that we may expect as the reward of such contemplation is not a deliverance, but an opiate. If philosophy is to justify itself it must recognize and accept its obligation to aid in the creation and realization of human ideals, not in a realm apart, but in our everyday world of space and time and in the affairs of our common life.

B. H. BODE.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." NORMAN KEMP SMITH. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. 1918. Pp. lxi + 615.

It is evident on the face of it that this massive performance must rank with the labors of E. Caird, Stirling and Adamson in Scotland, Green in England, Watson in Canada (nor should one forget the bold, if a little slapdash, pioneering of Mahaffy in Ireland, at the beginning of the seventies). Nay, more, the new *Commentary* stands alone as the contribution in English to *Kant-philologie*. In a word, it places the United States once for all on the map of Kantian studies. Whatever be his judgment upon its details here or there, the *Commentary* can not fail to give keenest intellectual pleasure to every competent Kantian, and to elicit his grateful admiration. Running to something more than 300,000 words, its bare elaboration, all else omitted, reduces a first impression, such as this review, to a mere foretaste. Only when we revert to the work time and again, as we shall, and use it familiarly in advanced instruction, as we must, may we hope to estimate it adequately *pro* or *con*. Professor Smith has won this meed of praise fairly. And I should like to add a word in recognition of the London Macmillans. So long as a publishing house is able and willing to undertake such a charge at such a time, no competent scholar need quail before the "hopelessness" of prospects in print. Some publishers, *ex abundante cautela*, can not see scholarship for text-books; others—all honor to them—recall Seneca's maxim, *non refert quam multos, sed quam bonos habeas*, to act upon

it. The great Edinburgh firm, R. and R. Clark, has put its best foot foremost in the essential matters of presswork and paper, reminding us that printing, no less than education and theology, is a "main industry" of the Scots capital. The proof-reading has been so good that I have noted but a single remarkable error. It occurs in the index, and is curious enough to warrant comment. My brilliant pupil, Mr. William Romaine Paterson, who chooses to be known by the pen-name, Benjamin Swift, is substituted for the author of *Gulliver's Travels*! This is indeed new evidence of the innate capacities of Schematism!

In the case of a work so complex, and complex so necessarily, one must attempt to give a clear view of the plan adopted by the author. At the outset, then, it may be said that cross-reference to Professor Smith's previous book, *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, is indispensable—a good reason for its appearance on the title-page. Again, Professor Smith calls attention to a convenient device adopted in the table of contents:

Should readers who are already well acquainted with the *Critique* desire to use my *Commentary* for its systematic discussions of Kant's teaching, rather than as an accompaniment to their study of the text, I may refer them to those sections which receive italicized headings in the table of contents (p. ix).

Thus, giving careful and very full references to the pagination of the First and Second Editions of the *K. d. r. V.*, to Adickes's edition, and to the Berlin edition of the *Werke*, he operates a twofold plan. On the one hand, he restates the Kantian arguments in his own way, with frequent quotations, and supplying such elucidations of technical language as he deems requisite; on the other, he introduces lengthy comments of his own, chiefly with a view to overcome or explain the constant contradictions, apparent or absolute, which constitute perhaps the most remarkable, certainly the most baffling, feature of Kant's procedure, and are, paradoxically, as much merits as blots.

The *Critique* is not merely defective in clearness or popularity of exposition. That is a common failing of metaphysical treatises, especially when they are in the German language, and might pass without special remark. What is much more serious, is that Kant flatly contradicts himself in almost every chapter; and that there is hardly a technical term which is not employed by him in a variety of different and conflicting senses. As a writer, he is the least exact of all the great thinkers. . . . The contradictory character of the contents of the *Critique* . . . is inseparably bound up with what may perhaps be regarded as Kant's supreme merit as a philosophical thinker, especially as shown in the first *Critique*,—namely, his open-minded recognition of the complexity of his problems, and of the many difficulties which lie in the way of any solution which he is himself able to propound. Kant's method of working seems to have consisted in alternating between the various possible solutions, developing each in turn, in the hope that some midway position, which would share in the merits of all,

might finally disclose itself. When, as frequently happened, such a midway solution could not be found, he developed his thought along the parallel lines of the alternative views. . . . The composite character of the *Critique* is largely concealed by the highly elaborate, and extremely artificial, arrangement of its parts. . . . By its uniformity and rigour it gives the appearance of systematic order even when such order is wholly absent (pp. xx, xxi).

A good example of both Professor Smith's methods of procedure is furnished by the discussion of Time, in Part I., Section II. of the Transcendental *Æsthetic*. First, under the caption TIME (the small capitals indicating Kant, not Smith on Kant), we find some six pages devoted to a restatement of the five "Arguments," with a view to elicit the precise point of Kant's approach, and to consolidate the divergent lines of the First and Second Editions. This done, our author proceeds immediately to "systematic discussions" (indicated by italicised headings in the table of contents) of *Kant's Views regarding the Nature of Arithmetical Science*, and his *Conflicting Views of Time* (rather more than 14 pages). Then follow a series of GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL *ÆSTHETIC*, purely expository in character (12 pages). The section concludes with further "systematic discussions" of *The Distinction between Appearance and Illusion*, *Kant's Relation to Berkeley*, and *The Paradox of Incongruous Counterparts* (18 pages). After this fashion—the capitalized and italicized captions giving the clue in every case—Professor Smith exhibits the internal meanderings of Kant's thought straight through the *Critique*. Naturally, the element of interpretation (Smith on Kant) waxes most when we come to the Deduction, where we find no less than 131 consecutive pages devoted to decisive, even meticulous, exposition—a masterly achievement.

An Introduction and an Appendix complete the volume. The former consists of three parts, as follows. (1) An investigation of Kant's method of composing the *K. d. r. V.* This is essentially an excursion in higher criticism. Kant's correspondence, and the labors of B. Erdmann (1878–84), Adickes (1889–95), Reicke (1889–95), and Vaihinger (1881—), especially in the *Reflexionen*, the *Loose Blätter*, and the textual criticism of the *Critique*, are given due weight (6 pages). The mass of evidence thus furnished receives constant attention throughout the volume. (2) A discussion of Kant's relation to Hume and Leibniz (8 pages). This is further elaborated in the Appendix. I am not sure that the separation is the best plan, though I detect Professor Smith's reasons. After all, the matter is one of opinion. (3) Eight preliminary difficulties are elucidated here (rather more than 28 pages). These are—the *a priori*; Kant and logic; the nature of consciousness; Kant's phenomenalism; the distinction between human and animal intelligence; self-consciousness;

the distinction between sensibility, understanding and reason; the place of the *K. d. r. V.* in Kant's system.

As just noted, the Appendix offers "a more detailed statement of Kant's relations to his philosophical predecessors" (25 pages). Going behind Hume and Leibniz, stress is laid upon Descartes, Galileo, and the doctrine of representative perception. This leads forthwith to Berkeley (discussed also at pp. 155 ff.), and to further remarks upon Hume, with a comparatively brief conclusion on Leibniz-Wolffianism.

The Index is adequate, no more. It might have been a good deal fuller.

The Dedication to Adamson, Professor Smith's chief at Glasgow, is a charming piece of *pietas*; for, as those of us who enjoyed the privilege of his acquaintance are well aware, not only was he the acutest, but also the most learned of the first generation of Idealists. His untimely death, at the moment when his extraordinary equipment was on the point of being put to constructive use, prevented the completion of a *magnum opus* in the manner which Professor Smith perpetuates. This *Commentary* was Adamson's suggestion, and I sense the presence of his spirit continually.

Finally, Professor Smith gives us the welcome news, "I have in preparation a translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*." Those who have sighed over Max Müller, whose knowledge of philosophy was sadly to seek, or over Meiklejohn, whose English is at least as difficult as the plaguey original, will murmur, "when the day breaks and the shadows flee away." I mention this promise to express the hope that the new translation will be *printed* with the *Commentary* in view; in other words, that, by some typographical device, Professor Smith will make it possible, even if it can not be made easy, for the student to use both together.

As I have hinted above, one must live more than a few weeks with this *Commentary* in order to undertake decisive criticism and—I am in no mood to look a real gift-horse in the mouth. Thanks rather than fault-finding meets the situation. Moreover, like every patient student of Kant, Professor Smith has quite disabused himself of the seductive notion that definitive pronouncements are possible. Pivotal events—crucial books among them—must be appropriated afresh by each successive generation. "The *Critique* deals with issues that are still controversial, and their interpretation is possible only from a definite standpoint."

In the first place, then, I think that Professor Smith may lay claim to the practise of his precept—"arbitrary and merely personal judgments I have endeavored to avoid." For the rest, questions at issue must remain at issue, thanks to perspective, as he recognizes

frankly. Thus, my own view of the problem presented by Kant contrasts with that of this *Commentary* because it belongs to the generation of Scots students before Professor Smith, and represents tendencies peculiar to the period falling between the work of E. Caird and the full stress of the reaction against "the perversely Hegelian character of Caird's and Watson's manner of interpreting the *Critique*" (p. 462). More than twenty-eight years ago (*Scottish Review*, July, 1890), I had the temerity to declare myself unable to accept Caird's great work as in all ways satisfactory—it was too smooth, presenting Kant as if he had read Hegel. As we were then in the stage of the dogmatism that accompanies hero-worship, the orthodox of course held a silly commination service over me, and I was banned with bell, book and candle. Naturally, I turned to Schopenhauer and Stirling for further ideas, but found them guilty of incredible misconceptions which, I am glad to note, Professor Smith has exposed without mercy. In particular, I came to see that the objective deduction, missed so completely by Schopenhauer and Stirling, implies that the subjective deduction (whereof Kant speaks in his customary, not to say loose, fashion) must be interpreted in terms of an objective system. Thus, my approach did not come by way of Neo-kantian criticism of the text, and this serves to explain such doubts as I entertain, not so much about Professor Smith's interpretation as about his emphases. But, after all, these reduce themselves to questions of relative stress. For instance, as I often used to say to Caird, I greatly doubt whether it is now possible to recover the influence of Hume in the decisive style to which Professor Smith tends; and, possibly, more may be said for Rousseau than the *Commentary* indicates, although not nearly so much as Höffding alleges. Again, I am not at all clear that higher criticism of the *Critique*, especially of the Deduction, enables us to reconstitute Kant's precise mental attitude in specific years. Nay, I am inclined to believe that his state of mind was actually a state of spirit, and depended chiefly upon his reaction to moral issues, itself a survival of his inbred Pietism. His permanent tendency here is, to say the least, in lurid contrast with that of the eighteenth century men, who are permeated by the cynicism of the *salon* or the gay trifling of my lady's chamber. In short, many of the contradictions incident to the first *Critique* ought to be appraised in the light of the second, which, at all events by the time the first came to be literally thrown together, was no afterthought. In a word, even granting the intellectual bias of the first, a purely intellectual discussion of Kant's outlook misses most important influences due to his practical interests. And, in a measure, Professor Smith seems to me to have fallen into this trap, perhaps unavoidably. On the other hand, he recognizes that Kant's epistem-

ological agnosticism does pass over into a metaphysic wherein the distinction between appearance and reality, enforced on this agnostic basis, becomes quite irrelevant. "The true critical teaching is that synthetic thinking is alone fundamental, and that only by a regress upon it can judgment be adequately accounted for" (p. 196). True. But, then, What is this synthetic thinking? One must seek it out in Kant's distinction between *Vorstellungen*, things in themselves, and *objects* of our representation; one must delimitate the problem by recalling that the last differ from the first no less than from the second. And this means that the conditions of unity in consciousness are also conditions of the possibility of consciousness. Kant's apparent agnosticism is valuable principally as a foil. It serves to show that, after all, he is thoroughly in earnest with the contention that only a metaphysic can deal with the problem on hand. Amphiboly is not the last word, as the discussion of the Physico-Theological Proof fully attests. And this leads at once to the considerations raised in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. If the moral law can not be regarded as illusory, can anything be so regarded which stands as a proven condition of consciousness? I need hardly say that Professor Smith is perfectly aware of all these points; but he does not attach sufficient weight to them on the whole interpretation. He would probably say, "I am interpreting the *Critique of Pure Reason alone*." And I would reply, "Yes, but you lay too little stress on these essential points, too much on philological adventures" cf. pp. 235, 243, 294, 397, etc.). But, these differences of opinion nowise cloud my appreciation of a splendid performance. For, as Professor Smith says,

The distinction between appearance and reality is not a contrast between experience and the non-experienced, but a distinguishing of factors, which are essential to all experience. . . . Like so many of the most important and fruitful of his tenets, these consequences are suggested by implication; or rather remain to be discovered by the reader's own independent efforts, in proportion as he thinks himself into the distinctions upon which, in other connections, Kant has himself insisted (pp. 416, 414 ff.).

In conclusion, the equipment of the author, seen in his sure steps over a wonderful sweep, suggests relevant, and not very comforting, questions about our whole method of philosophical instruction to-day. I, for one, gravely doubt whether philosophy can be saved by the pathetic material and fragmentary methods that afflict our Graduate Schools. The joysome prattle of the irresponsible pragmatic youth is not encouraging, even if that very old saw, "Go up, thou bald-head," directed at scholars who have borne the burden and heat of the day, suffice to raise a bitter-sweet smile. While the aridities of the wiseacres of realism (illustrated remarkably in a recent fat tome) remind one forcibly of the sad small-talk "proper" to mourn-

ers at a funeral; the very expression of emotion and "thought" serves to falsify both. Had we more books fit to stand comparison with this *Commentary*, the outlook would be less dubious by far. For, to be plain, philosophy is neither a combination of self-titillating assurance with purblind idiocy, nor of self-appreciative opinionatedness with an altruism that weeps over the mob and never does a good turn to a single individual. In any case, Professor Smith has made it perfectly plain yet again that those who forego profound scholarship also forego the right to indulge even superficial criticism.

R. M. WENLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

The Structure of Lasting Peace. HORACE MEYER KALLEN. Boston: Marshall Jones Company. 1918. Pp. xv + 187.

If the Allies are fighting for any one thing it should be for a righteous world after the war. It is not so much lack of power and means, as lack of imagination, good will, generosity and patience that makes a world of social and economic justice seem so remote. But the world is getting such an education in patience, self-sacrifice and social purposes, that its old helplessness, its old inertia of habit and tradition need no longer be treated so respectfully. The first thing to do in the way of getting a rational world is to really want it. If we really want it, the chief obstacle to getting it is a confusion of bad habits, outworn traditions and selfish interests. These however are not immutable. Measures can be taken to remove them and to prevent their coming back, if we really wish to and will to.

Of course the great obstacle at present to a righteous world is the German will, organized for conquering and exploiting the world. No peace can have the elements of stability that does not begin with making Germany powerless for harm in the future. A lasting peace will then have to be a peace dictated by the powers that are fighting for democracy. But it must be dictated in a spirit of loyalty to the real democracy of the future; it must not aim to recover and keep the sham democracy of the *status quo ante*. Our past experience in diplomacy, our precedents, are based on that sham democracy. And the hosts of interests commonly designated as capital and class are the mark of it, and these, after the German peril, are the second obstacle to justice and durable peace. To win back the old pluralistic nationalism, will be to perpetuate the old frictions and dangers. Only an organized internationalism in the form of a league of nations with arrangements for preventing the misunderstandings and cross-purposes of the past can transform humanity into a world society. Of this ideal America, though hardly perhaps aware of it yet, is the uncompromised champion, and President Wilson the spokesman.